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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID E. BEAN, Administrator of the
Estate of Alice A. M. Carlos, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

No. 10899

ARCHIE T. CARLOS,

Defendant and Appellant,

VERA EMELINE HOLLIST, MARY
ALICE CARLOS and GLENN GREEN,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court
denying defendant's motion to vacate a judgment.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court denied defendant's motion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's order
denying the motion.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant's Statement of Facts is largely irrelevant
and is argumentative. It deals with the merits of the cause
of action sued on, and hence with matters not properly before the court. Plaintiff submits the following:
Plaintiff filed suit in the court below alleging that an
attempted property transfer was testamentary in nature,
and therefore in violation of the statutes governing wills.
Plaintiff further alleged that the scheme was effected as a
result of undue influence on the grantor-testatrix (R.1-5).
Issue was joined (R.6,7,13-21), discovery was made (R.812), pre-trial was had (R.25-27) and the case came on for
trial on August 4, 1965 (R.38). After one-half day of trial,
the parties agreed on a compromise settlement, and the same
was stated into the record.
Plaintiff's counsel prepared a written stipulation (Def's
Exh. 1, Hearing of April 19, 1966) which was sent to defendant's counsel for signature, but defendant refused to sign it.
Defendant then submitted a claim in the estate matter, and
his claim was denied. (Probate File No. 172~). Defendant
then discharged his attorney and hired present counsel.
On April 12, 1966, defendant's present counsel filed a
motion to vacate the judgment. Hearing was had on the
motion on April 19, 1966, and on March 23, 1967, the court
denied the motion. Defendant appeals from the denial.
All references to the transcript, unless otherwise stated,
mean the transcript of the second hearing, April'l9, 1966.
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VA CATE JUDGMENT WAS PROPER.
The defendant's motion to vacate the judgment entered
was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
that court's denial of defendant's motion should be affirmed
unless an abuse of such discretion is clearly shown. Warren
1.'. Dixon Ranch Company, 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953),
Haner v. Haner, 13 U.2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962). In the
Haner case this court said :
It is the purpose of the law to afford the parties full

opportunity to have themselves and their witnesses
present; and to present their evidence and their contentions to the court. When this has been done and
the court has made its determination, that should end
the matter, except for the right of appeal. It is so
patent as to hardly justify comment that a judgment
should not be set aside merely to grant the losing
party another chance to accomplish the task at which
he just failed: to prove that he was right and that the
opponent was wrong. To reopen a case just because
a party persists in asserting and attempting to prove
that his version of the dispute was the truth and that
of the opponent was false would open the door to a
repetition of that procedure, whoever won the next
time; and thus to keeping the dispute going ad infinitum with no way of determining when the merrygo-round of the lawsuit would end.
Fraud was alleged in the Haner case, and the same
allegation has been made by defendant here, though not so
denominated. Defendant claims he did not consent to a
compromise made in open court, but if he didn't, then the
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attorneys and the court perpetrated a fraud. Possibly defendant's reason for not so naming it is the higher burden of
proof required, and this would be a problem for defendant
in light of the quality of his proof.
Excerpts from the transcripts of the two hearings are
appropriate at this point to focus attention on just what the
trial judge had before him in considering defendant's motion. The court is referred to the transcript of the afternoon
session of the August 4, 1965, hearing, pages 43 to 48. This
is set out correctly in defendant's brief, and there is no need
to repeat it here. It shows that defendant was present when
the settlement was stated into the record, that his attorney
was present and participated in the framing of the terms,
and that the trial judge specifically addressed a question to
defendant and defendant said he "guessed" he understood it,
and neither defendant nor his counsel raised any objection
or question as to any part of the compromise except the
moving of the silo, and that was settled before completion
of the discussion.
Set over against that, are the affidavit and testimony
on direct examination of defendant Archie Carlos in support
of his motion to vacate. He said he never stipulated to a
judgment against him for $5,000.00 (R.42) ; that he didn't
know, when at court on August 4, 1965, that the case had
been settled ( T .4, L.25) ; that he didn't authorize Mr. Judd,
who had been his attorney for five years, to and including
the time of the trial, to stipulate for settlement of the controversy (T.5, L.6) ; that he didn't participate in a meeting for
a discussion of settlement (T.5, L.11), and that he didn't
know what a stipulation was (T.5, L.20).
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However, on cross examination he admitted:
That he'd had four lawyers represent him on this case
(T.19, L.24).
That his second lawyer had also counseled him to settle
the case (T.10, L.23).
That Mr. Judd had been his lawyer and had represented
him from sometime in 1960 until March (or perhaps
February) of 1966 (T.12, L.8).
That he sat in court and listened to the proceedings on
August 4, 1965 (T.12, L.25).
That he sat on the first row of the courtroom seats
(T.12, L.30; T.13, L.1-6).
That his hearing was good enough to hear what went
on (T.13, L.9).
That he knew what was being done (T.13, L.11).
That he knew that Mr. Judd was agreeing in defendant's behalf that defendant would pay $5,000.00 (T.14,
L.7,28).
'l'hat he did some talking himself when the stipulation
was stated for the record (T.15, L.11), and no one kept him
from saying what he wanted to say (T.15, L.24).
That he raised a question as to a silo, but didn't question
anything else about the settlement (T.16, L.13; T.23, L.19).
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That when he said "I don't go much for that," he meant
he didn't go much for moving the silo (T.17, L.5-12).
That his prior lawyer had advised him of the thirty-day
appeal time (T.19, L.3-10), but he did not instruct his
lawyer to file an appeal (T.19, L.13).
That his fourth lawyer told him there might be a means
of appealing the case (T.19, L.28).
That counsel and their clients spent most of the afternoon at the hearing on August 4, 1965, working out the
settlement (T.22, L.23).
That all the details were worked out about use of the
silo and the moving of it (T.23, L.4).
That he had come to court on August 4, 1965, prepared
to put in evidence in support of a claim that he had spent
money in his mother's behalf and in protection of or improvement of her property, and that those same expenditures were the subject of the claim he later filed in the
probate matter (T.27, L.8-28).
And that the settlement disposed of any claim he had
against the estate ( T .28, L.3).

•

It is the defendant's own testimony which knocks the

props out from under his claim. The foregoing answers on
cross-examination lead to but one conclusion: That the testimony of defendant and his wife at the second hearing to the
effect that defendant did not authorize the stipulation made
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by his lawyer at the first hearing, is wholly unworthy of
belief. His claim of no authority is rather incredible. In spite
of what the record shows, he asks this court to hold that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion, even
though his present claim flies squarely in the face of everything the trial court saw and heard at the first hearing. He
has no explanation for the fact that after lengthy negotiations, it was stipulated by his attorney that he would pay
$5,000.00 to plaintiff and waive all claim to anything from
the estate. He has no explanation for the fact that he expressed no objection to anything at the time that stipulation
was made, except to the moving of a silo, and even acquiesced
to that after the details were worked out.
The defendant, Archie Carlos, is not exactly a shrinking
violet. If his attorney was "selling him down the river," why
didn't he stand up and say so in court? Does he want us to
believe that the courtroom was the Star Chamber rather
than an American court of law? Why did his wife sit silent?
Why didn't they both repudiate the attorney's agreements,
and denounce him as a fraud? Why didn't the defendant
deny, then and there, his attorney's authority to make the
settlement? Why did defendant wait eight and one-half
months, until after his claim was rejected in the probate
matter, before filing this motion to vacate the judgment?
Defendant didn't return the written stipulation with a
complaint that it didn't agree with the terms stipulated into
the record at court. His refusal was a flat refusal to perform, in any manner whatsoever, the agreement there made.
He was going to go right ahead just as if there had been no
suit and no compromise at court. After the entry of findings
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of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, he made no
motion to amend or correct these pleadings so as to make
them conform, and made no claim that they did not truly
reflect the agreement made in open court.
The fact is that the evidence that morning of August 4,
1965, began to look bad for defendant's position, and his
attorney knew somewhat of the further evidence yet to come
in. So, upon his attorney's advice, he agreed to a settlement
which provided, among other things, that he should pay
$5,000.00 to plaintiff. And he's had enough education to
know what it means to pay $5,000.00. But doubtless the
thought rankled him after he had slept on it, and when it
came right down to time to pay up, he rebelled and refused
to sign the written stipulation and instead filed a claim
against the estate. When that was denied, he told his
attorney to appeal the case, but by then his appeal rights
had long ago run out. So he discharged his lawyer, retained
other counsel, and tried an appeal by the present method.
That this is an attempt to appeal from the judgment
entered four months earlier seems to be borne out by the
statement of facts and part of the argument in defendant's
brief. These deal at length with the facts and law of the
case on its merits, and such are not properly before the
court on this appeal. The sole question, pertinent here, is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion to vacate the judgment. Only that denial is in question here.
Worth noting at this point is the objectionable procedure followed in defendant's attempt to support the instant
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motion. Plaintiff is aware of the provisions of Rule 43 ( e),
U.R.C.P., that the court may hear oral testimony in support
of a motion, but believes that such testimony must be relevant to the grounds set forth in the motion itself. Such is the
requirement of Rule 7 (b) ( 1), i.e., that the grounds of the
motion shall be stated with particularity. Here, defendant's
motion sets forth four alleged grounds: (1) Inconsistency,
(2) no supporting pleadings, (3) no (written) stipulation,
and (4) no authority from the probate court. Defendant's
affidavit in support of the motion recites only that he never
made an oral stipulation and never signed the written one,
and so advised his attorney. But his testimony, elicited on
direct examination, dealt particularly with his vrior lawyer's
authority to make the settlement agreement in open court
in defendant's behalf. That is a horse of another color, and
plaintiff had no opportunity to meet that testimony. It was
not relevant to the grounds set forth in the motion itself,
was objected to and should not have been admitted. Rule
6 ( d) requires five days' notice before the hearing of the
motion, but this is meaningless if the moving party can shift
to a different ground at the time of the hearing.
Defendant claims he never authorized an oral stipulation in open court, but says that if he did it's not binding on
him because the parties contemplated a written stipulation.
They certainly did, because it was necessary that the bank
account be more specifically identified and that the metes
and bounds descriptions and other references to affected
realty be determined. But that was the only purpose of the
written stipulation, and there was nothing tenuous or conditional about the oral stipulation. It was final, complete,
and agreed to by everyone present in court, including Archie
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and his counsel. As a result of it, the trial was stopped,
subpoened witnesses were released from their obligation,
trial strategies theretofore undisclosed were freely discussed,
part of the property was surveyed, and money was paid by
some of the defendants. To allow Archie now to repudiate
his settlement would be to allow him to perpetrate a fraud.
It would mean that a litigant who senses a trial may be
going badly can stop it in the middle, agree in open court to
a compromise, then repudiate the compromise, fall back and
regroup his forces, discharge his lawyer, retain a new one,
and have another run at it. Such conduct and procedure has
never been countenanced, for reasons founded on estoppel
if for none other, and it should not be countenanced now.
Defendant's brief frequently refers to "uncontradicted"
testimony. Uncontradicted by what? On cross-examination,
Archie contradicted himself rather badly. All of the prior
proceedings contradict him. Reason and logic contradict him.
In short, his self-serving testimony elucidates nothing.

POINT II
THE STIPULATION DIDN'T HAVE TO BE AUTHOR
IZED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
Archie and the other children of Alice A. M. Carlos,
deceased, were the record owners of her real estate. Deeds
delivered more than ninety days after her death had been
recorded in their names. The administrator owned nothing,
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and it was incumbent on him to bring suit to recover the
real estate. Unless he prevailed in the suit, there was nothing
to account for in the estate matter.
Defendant's reasoning in Part 2 of his brief is fallacious.
Since the administrator owned no real estate, there didn't
have to be any conveyance by him, and hence no confirmation of sale. The reason for quit-claim deeds referred to in
the stipulation discussion at the first hearing is that plaintiff had recorded a !is pendens and a title insuring organization might want a quit-claim deed rather than a mere release
of the lis pendens.
Sec. 75-11-12, UCA 1953, relied on by defendant, is
inapplicable. Its provisions clearly refer to compromises of
acknowledged debts where there is no dispute of the existence or justice of the debt, but the debtor cannot pay all his
debts, and in such cases the executor or administrator may
enter into a composition with the defendant and the other
creditors.
But in any event, defendant is premature in his complaint. He repudiated the settlement and the administrator
now has nothing to get approval of. If defendant will
perform, plaintiff will account to the probate court and get
the accounting approved.
And finally, Archie has no standing to complain about
what is done in the probate matter since he waived any
claim to the estate property as part of the compromise.
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POINT III
THE PROBATE COURT DIRECTED PROSECUTION OF
THIS SUIT.
Since the printing and filing of appellant's brief, the
record in the probate file has been corrected by order of the
District Court, so as to reflect that which occurred on
November 19, 1963, upon the hearing of a motion brought
by Archie Carlos to revoke letters of administration issued
by David E. Bean. The court denied the motion and directed
the administrator to proceed with all expediency to a hearing of the case. Defendant's argument that the stipulation
amounted to the distribution of an estate is false and about
the only reply that can be made has already been made, i.e.,
that if Archie will perform his agreements under the compromise settlement, then the assets of the estate can be
accounted for to the court and the other requirements of the
probate code can be met and the assets distributed in accordance with that code.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS FULLY SUPPORTED IN THE EVIDENCE.
Matters raised in Point IV of defendant's brief are
mostly a restatement of points raised elsewhere in his brief.
One contention, however, seems to be that since Archie and
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his wife were the only witnesses who testified at the second
hearing, the trial court was compelled to believe their testimony. The law is clearly to the contrary. In re Richards'
Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297 P.2d 542 (1956).
No finder of fact is bound to believe any witness, and
this is especially so where the testimony of that witness is
inherently improbable as it was in this case. Judge Swan
could and did find that the testimony of Archie and his wife
at the second hearing was entitled to no weight, and he was
at liberty to disregard it. He had been present when the
whole matter was settled on August 4, 1965, and he was
entitled to weigh all that transpired that day against
Archie's testimony at the second hearing.

CONCLUSION
Since there is a presumption on appeal that the findings
and judgment of the trial court are correct, appellant must
sustain the burden of demonstration to the contrary if he
is to prevail. In addition, the facts on appeal are viewed in
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
Citizens Casualty Co. of New York v. Hackett, 17 U.2d 304,
410 P.2d 767 (1966), Ortega v. Thomas, 14 U.2d 296, 383
P.2d 406 (1963). Appellant has not sustained his burden.
Archie Carlos had his day in court. He was represented
by able and resourceful counsel. He stipulated to a compromise settlement in the course of trial, but when it came to
the formal entry of the judgment, he reversed himself and
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refused to perform. Such duplicity should be neither encouraged nor tolerated, and the judgment entered pursuant
to the stipulation should be upheld. The order of the trial
court denying defendant's motion to vacate the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
K. ROGER BEAN
Bean and Bean
50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

